Five partly successive and partly overlapping framings have dominated the public debate about human embryonic stem cells since they first were “derived” a decade ago. Geron Corporation staged the initial framings as 1) basic research and 2) medical hope, but these two were immediately refuted and opposed by 3) bioethical concerns, voiced by influential politicians and leaders of opinion. Thereafter, the research community presented adult stem cells and therapeutic cloning as 4) techno-fix solutions supposed to bypass these ethical concerns. And (...) in recent years, 5) institutional limitations to and hurdles within the university–industrial complex (such as patentability, misconduct and fraud) have attracted more attention. The article purifies the arguments and points out the interests and institutions behind the five framings. It also discusses their interplay and finally addresses the question of what happened to the stem cells? (shrink)

The target article elaborates upon an extant theoretical framework, “Imitation and Innovation: The Dual Engines of Cultural Learning.” We raise three major concerns: (1) There is limited discussion of cross-cultural universality and variation; (2) overgeneralization of overimitation and omission of other social learning types; and (3) selective imitation in infants and toddlers is not discussed.

For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.

The vital status of patients who are a part of controlled donation after circulatory death (cDCD) is widely debated in bioethical literature. Opponents to currently applied cDCD protocols argue that they violate the dead donor rule, while proponents of the protocols advocate compatibility. In this article, we argue that both parties often misinterpret the moral implications of the dead donor rule. The rule as such does not require an assessment of a donor’s vital status, we contend, but rather an assessment (...) of whether procurement of organs in cDCD cause the death of the donor or not. We then argue that commonly practiced cDCD protocols do not violate the dead donor rule, since the donation does not trigger or cause the death of the donors. (shrink)

This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point (...) that we make by drawing an analogy with de Finetti's argument against mandating countable additivity. Having presented the best version of the Orgulity Argument, our second aim is to develop a reply to it. We extend Elga's idea of appealing to finitely additive probability to show that the challenge posed by the Orgulity Argument can be met. (shrink)

In the opening chapter of his thirty-sixth oration, Dio Chrysostom tells his listeners how in the course of a journey ‘through the lands of the Scythians to that of the Getae’, he stopped over in the city of Borysthenes ‘in the summer after my exile’. Dio had been exiled by Domitian, probably in a.d. 83 or 84; since his exile ended after the death of Domitian in September 96, it is generally accepted that his visit to Borysthenes took place in (...) the summer of 97. (shrink)

Recent impossibility theorems for fair risk assessment extend to the domain of epistemic justice. We translate the relevant model, demonstrating that the problems of fair risk assessment and just credibility assessment are structurally the same. We motivate the fairness criteria involved in the theorems as also being appropriate in the setting of testimonial justice. Any account of testimonial justice that implies the fairness/justice criteria must be abandoned, on pain of triviality.

This quantitative study of 3557 high school teachers from 44 states assesses the implications of the social studies teacher-coach. The study compares social studies teacher-coaches and non-coaches in terms of teacher demographics and school contexts, disciplines taught, and instructional preferences. Substantial differences between coaches and non-coaches were found across gender, community type, and teaching experiences. Teacher-coaches disproportionately taught general classes such as government, Economics, and Geography, while non-coaches are more likely to teach Advanced Placement courses. Finally, self-report data measuring teacher's (...) instructional preferences indicates that teacher-coaches were more likely to indicate implementation of lectures, textbooks, worksheets, and videos, while non-coaches were more likely to indicate preference for examining photographs, artifacts, or primary materials. (shrink)

Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Initial subjectivity, the line goes, is of mere transient significance, giving way to intersubjective agreement eventually. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures that are updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. (...) We also show that such sets converge to a shared, maximally informed opinion. Convergence to a maximally informed opinion is a (weak) Jeffrey conditioning analogue of Bayesian “convergence to the truth” for conditional probabilities. Finally, we demonstrate the philosophical significance of our study by detailing applications to the topics of dynamic coherence, imprecise probabilities, and probabilistic opinion pooling. (shrink)

We provide counterexamples to some purported characterizations of dilation due to Pedersen and Wheeler :1305–1342, 2014, ISIPTA ’15: Proceedings of the 9th international symposium on imprecise probability: theories and applications, 2015).

Our aim here is to present a result that connects some approaches to justifying countable additivity. This result allows us to better understand the force of a recent argument for countable additivity due to Easwaran. We have two main points. First, Easwaran’s argument in favour of countable additivity should have little persuasive force on those permissive probabilists who have already made their peace with violations of conglomerability. As our result shows, Easwaran’s main premiss – the comparative principle – is strictly (...) stronger than conglomerability. Second, with the connections between the comparative principle and other probabilistic concepts clearly in view, we point out that opponents of countable additivity can still make a case that countable additivity is an arbitrary stopping point between finite and full additivity. (shrink)

Bayesians often appeal to “merging of opinions” to rebut charges of excessive subjectivity. But what happens in the short run is often of greater interest than what happens in the limit. Seidenfeld and coauthors use this observation as motivation for investigating the counterintuitive short run phenomenon of dilation, since, they allege, dilation is “the opposite” of asymptotic merging of opinions. The measure of uncertainty relevant for dilation, however, is not the one relevant for merging of opinions. We explicitly investigate the (...) short run behavior of the metric relevant for merging, and show that dilation is independent of the opposite of merging. (shrink)

Analysis (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab012.

Much research has studied the importance of play for children’s development. However, questions of its political importance and our public institutions’ duties to protect it have been largely neglected. This article argues that childhood play is politically important due to having both intrinsic and instrumental value, and it suggests that the duty to protect the capability for play in childhood falls especially on the public health system. If this argument succeeds, it follows that we have stronger duties toward our children (...) than we currently believe. (shrink)

© 2017. The American Astronomical Society. All rights reserved.We present new observations of the low-mass companion to HD 984 taken with the Gemini Planet Imager as a part of the GPI Exoplanet Survey campaign. Images of HD 984 B were obtained in the J and H bands. Combined with archival epochs from 2012 and 2014, we fit the first orbit to the companion to find an 18 au orbit with a 68% confidence interval between 14 and 28 au, an eccentricity (...) of 0.18 with a 68% confidence interval between 0.05 and 0.47, and an inclination of 119°with a 68% confidence interval between 114°and 125°. To address the considerable spectral covariance in both spectra, we present a method of splitting the spectra into low and high frequencies to analyze the spectral structure at different spatial frequencies with the proper spectral noise correlation. Using the split spectra, we compare them to known spectral types using field brown dwarf and low-mass star spectra and find a best-fit match of a field gravity M6.5 ±1.5 spectral type with a corresponding temperature of K. Photometry of the companion yields a luminosity of log=2.88 ± 0.07 dex with DUSTY models. Mass estimates, again from DUSTY models, find an age-dependent mass of 34 ±1 to 95 ±4 M Jup. These results are consistent with previous measurements of the object. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Reflecting on the North/south dialogue, I consider questions of global justice. I argue that questions of global justice are just as genuine as questions of domestic justice. A too narrow construal of the circumstances of justice leads to an arbitrary forestalling of questions of global justice. It isn't that we stand in conditions of reciprocal advantage that is crucial but that we stand in conditions of moral reciprocity. I first set out concerning the situation in the North and the (...) South and the relations between them something of the facts in the case coupled with some interpretative sociology. Such investigations show massive disparities of wealth and condition between North and South and further show that these disparities have been exacerbated by the interventionist policies of the West. I then, while remaining mindful of the strains of commitment, argue that justice requires extensive redistribution between North and South but that this can be done without at all impoverishing the North, though to do so would indeed involve a radical re‐ordering of the socio‐economic system of the North. (shrink)

There is a practical five-step method of ethics dialog developed by John Woolman, an 18th c. businessman and ethical activist, that was used by Robert K. Greenleaf, a 20th c. A.T.&T. Corporate Vice-President, that includes: (a) friendly, emotive affect; (b) discussion of mutual commonalities; (c) discussion of issue entanglements; (d) discussion of potential experimental solutions; and, (e) trial and feedback discussion. This method of dialog appears to proceed with a type of consciousness considered by John Woolman and Bernard Lonergan as (...) one where the I is conscious that I and Others are part of a more foundational, larger and prior We. This type of dialog is different than Socratic dialog. The corresponding type of consciousness is different than the more derivative, e.g., two allies being united in their response to a common goal. It is also different than Buber's I and Thou appreciative consciounsess of the interestingness, value, diversity, and uniqueness of others. Woolman dialog as seen in four cases appears to be a concrete method that has some value both as an end in itself and as instrumental means that can: be issue effective, help build ethical organization/community culture, and help facilitate peaceful, evolutionary change and development. Limitations of the method are also considered. The method may also be a several hundred year anticipation of experiment based pragmatist philosophy that is anthropologically sensitive to cultural entanglements. No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe, ... Each is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine.... John Donne (17th c.). (shrink)

When solving a decision problem we want to determine an optimal policy for the decision variables of interest. A policy for a decision variable is in principle a function over its past; however, some of the past may be irrelevant and for both communicational as well as computational reasons it is important not to deal with redundant variables in the policies. In this paper we present a method to decompose a decision problem into a collection of smaller sub-problems s.t. a (...) solution to the original decision problem can be found by solving the sub-problems independently. The method is based on an operational characterization of the future variables being relevant for a decision variable, thereby also providing a characterization of those parts of a decision problem that are relevant for a particular decision. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Black Deconstruction: Russell Atkins and the Reconstruction of African-American CriticismAldon Lynn Nielsen (bio)“What does that signify?” “It don’t signify nothin’ Mr. Warner.”—Russell Atkins, MaleficiumThere are, everywhere unheard (as one might see deep in an electron microscope) rigidities violently breaking—Russell Atkins, WhicheverCritical debates about the applicability of recent literary theories to the reading of African-American writing have often been marked by curious lacunae. Despite the rapid proliferation of critical (...) texts addressing themselves to black writing, it remains the case that many critics come to black writing with methodologies and agendas already in hand, while few critics have taken upon themselves the task of rereading the critical history of African-American work in theory. This has often resulted in a sort of critical shortsightedness, with the field of black literary theory presented as a foreshortened, if now more level, playing field. While some have engaged in arguments about the question of whether or not African-American writing should be engaged by poststructuralist theorists (a question that seems to begin with the assumption that poststructuralism is a particularly white mode of mythology), the fact is that a form of deconstruction had been theorized by an African-American poet long before deconstruction had entered the American academy. That this fact is largely unknown among contemporary critics is the result of a continuing practice of not reading the theoretical work of black poets who have published outside the established circuit of the academic press. With the prominent exceptions of poets like Amiri Baraka, June Jordan, Larry Neal, and Haki Madhabuti, the critical writings of recent African-American poets have seldom been collected and circulated in any very effective way. Characteristically, Neal’s essays were gathered into a book posthumously, and Madhabuti’s have been published and distributed primarily through his own publishing house. Even Baraka’s collections have been allowed to pass out of print in most instances, only the books on music remaining readily available throughout his career. This may change for black poets who write in more mainstream modes in the near future. Now that Rita Dove has served a term as Poet Laureate of the United States and Derek Walcott has won the Nobel Prize, we might expect a modest increase in interest by publishers and readers in critical works by poets whose forms are less troubling than their content. And black poets who attain academic credentials and write scholarly/critical essays, such as Nathaniel Mackey and Harryette Mullen, may succeed in getting their works published by the university presses. However, surveys of shelves in bookstores and [End Page 86] libraries will confirm that there has been little concern among even university and small presses to collect and preserve the critical legacy of black experimentalists in the way that the essays of Charles Olson, Ed Dorn, or Robert Creeley have been maintained before a public.Russell Atkins has been one of the most prolific and demanding of black poets writing criticism and theory in the last four decades, but like Percy Johnston, central figure of the Dasein group of poets centered at Howard University in the 1950s, he has had to publish most of this work through his own magazine and workshop press, and there has never been a published collection of his critical work. The special Russell Atkins number of the Free Lance, a journal with which Atkins was associated for two decades, included a section surveying his work in critical prose, but little of that work has found its way into the broader critical discourse of literary scholars (it has fared a little better with musicologists), and Atkins’s prose is infrequently cited. As eccentric as Atkins’s prose can sometimes be, these works are important early signs of a break with the “rigidities” of traditional humanist discourse among African-American writers. Atkins’s statements on music, literature, politics, and education parallel the works by Baraka leading into and out of the Black Arts Movement, but Atkins, as he does in his verse, travels an independent and often disturbing path.Speaking of Anthony Braxton’s experimentalism, Ronald Radano observes that it “emerged from the changing landscape of urban American life, from... (shrink)

Lo studio prende in esame sei questioni di Thomas Wylton sulla visione beatifica e una questione dal Quodlibet di Siberto di Beka, carmelitano, contemporaneo di Wylton. Il saggio confronta in modo analitico le posizioni dei due autori sul ruolo e la necessità del lumen gloriae nella visione beatifica nelle singole questioni di cui si dà a seguito l'edizione. I codici sono V’ = Vat. Borgh. 36; T' = Tortosa 88; S' = Vat. Borgh. 39. L'edizione, posta in appendice allo studio, (...) riguarda le seguenti porzioni testuali: Thomas Wylton, q. 2 [V', ff. 55va-56va]; q. 3 [V', ff. 56va-58ra]; q. 4 [V', ff. 58ra-va] T16 [T', ff. 46ra-48rb]; T19 [T', ff. 50ra-61vb]; T20 [T', ff. 61vb-62vb]; Siberto di Beka, Quodlibet, q. 16 [S', ff. 270va-272vb]. (shrink)

Das Kernanliegen Eugen Finks gilt dem Weltverhältnis des Menschen. Obgleich für ihn zunächst die Ansätze von Husserl und Heidegger richtungsweisend sind, legt Fink bereits in seiner bei Husserl angefertigten Dissertation den Grund zu seiner eigenständigen philosophischen Position. Sein späteres "kosmologisches" Denken erschließt dem Weltbegriff durch Rückgriff auf die philosophische Tradition neue Dimensionen und konkretisiert ihn zugleich im Rahmen einer Philosophischen Anthropologie, Sozialphilosophie und einer Philosophie des Pädagogischen. Mit dieser Verschränkung von Mensch und Kosmos bietet Finks Werk bedeutsame Ansatzpunkte für die (...) interdisziplinäre geistes- und naturwissenschaftliche Forschung. Der erste Teil des Buches verortet Finks kosmologisches Denken im Kontext der philosophischen Tradition. Im zweiten Teil wird Finks Konzept sowohl bezüglich seines Gesamtentwurfs wie seiner philosophisch-anthropologischen, sozialtheoretischen und religionsphilosophischen Implikationen befragt. Der Band wird durch Finks Studie "Nietzsches Metaphysik des Spiels" eröffnet. Diese aus dem Jahr 1946 stammende und bislang unveröffentlichte Arbeit belegt die wichtige Rolle, die Nietzsche bei der Ausbildung von Finks Denken von Welt gespielt hat. (shrink)

In their article, Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland defend the moral permissibility of cDCD, suggesting that much of the controversy around this donation practice has been the result of a misinterpretatio...

In this slender volume in The Humanist Library series, Nielsen not only argues for the independence of morality from religion, but as well outlines a normative theory as an alternative to religious [[sic]] morality. The basis of religious morality is the belief that God is all good, and thus we should do what he commands. In response to this, Nielsen elaborates Plato’s argument that morality cannot be based upon religious belief. However one understands the claim "God is good," (...) i.e., whether it is analytic or not, understanding "good" is logically presupposed for one to be able to grasp the meaning or truth of the claim. It is more correct to say that religion is based upon morality since the basis of religious belief is that there is a being worthy of worship, and this conclusion must rest upon autonomous moral insight. The remainder of the book is concerned with two themes involving the competing claims of secular and religious morality. The first is that only the religious perspective provides an adequate account of man’s origin and destiny, and thus the perspective from which one can find happiness and fulfillment. In response, Nielsen invokes "all the old as well as some new objections to religion" as the perspective which provides a true account of the nature of things. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that only religious persons find happiness and meaning in life. The second claim of religious morality is that it alone can provide a satisfactory basis for moral theory. Secular moral theory can provide only conventional relativism. In reply, Nielsen outlines and defends a normative theory of the consequentialist variety. The last part of the book is a general defense of consequential ethical theories against Anscombe-like objections which are associated with "religious absolutism" for reasons not specified.—T.K.H. (shrink)

In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen (2003b) defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian (...) commitments. Indeed, the internationalism underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice (e.g., chs. 5 and 6). (shrink)

When assessing a new philosophical theory of psychopathology, a first question might be: is it descriptive or revisionary in intent? Does it aim to provide reflective understanding of what is already meant by correct uses of ‘mental disorder’? Or instead to redeploy that familiar term in articulating a new concept meeting particular desiderata? Nielsen offers us an ‘enactive conceptualization’ of mental disorder, and conceptualizations are typically understood as inventive rather than descriptive. However it was not entirely clear to me, (...) from reading his text, that this was indeed his ambition. My first question for Nielsen, then, is clarificatory: does he intend his project as descriptive or revisionary?If the... (shrink)

The five authors vary in the degree to which the recent neuroscience of the REM state leads them towards multiple dimensions and forms of dreaming consciousness (Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms) or toward all-explanatory single factor models (Vertes & Eastman, Revonsuo). The view of the REM state as a prolongation of the orientation response to novelty fits best with the former pluralisms but not the latter monisms. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms; Vertes & Eastman].

Kai Nielsen's work truly is a model for what engaged philosophical argument can and should aspire to be. He is militantly committed to clarity and to the rejection of dogma. His palpable good faith and sincerity are evident in everything he writes. I can't pretend to have read more than a fraction of Nielsen's voluminous writings, but one of my favorite passages of his is from a recent essay and is reprinted in Globalization and Justice:.

Nielsen [Nielsen, T. . Felt presence: Paranoid delusion or hallucinatory social imagery? Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 975–983.] raises a number of issues and presents several provocative arguments worthy of discussion regarding the experience of the felt presence during sleep paralysis . We consider these issues beginning with the nature of FP and its relation to affective-motivational systems and provide an alternative to Nielsen’s reduction of FP to a purely spatial hallucination. We then consider implications of the “normal (...) social imagery” model. We can find only one specific empirical hypothesis articulated within this framework and it turns out to be one that we explicitly addressed in our original paper. We also review our position regarding the possible relation of FP during SP to a number of related anomalous experiences and contrast FP to anomalous vestibular-motor phenomena. We review our position that the neuromatrix concept, in the light of available evidence, is more appropriately applied to V-M experiences than FP. Finally, we pursue speculations, raised in Nielsen’s commentary, on the wider implications of FP. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:384 BOOK REVIEWS Philosophy and.Atheism: In Defense of.Atheism. By KAI NIELSEN. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1985. Pp. 231. $18.95. Kai Nielsen is among the most prolific, trenchant, and articulate critics of religion now working in the world of English-speaking philosophy. In a steady spate of articles and books, including (to mention a few) Contemporary Critiques of Religion, Scepticism, Reason and Practice, Ethics Without God, and An (...) Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, he has mounted a relentless and sophisticated attack on religious belief. The collection called Philosophy and.Atheism: In Defense of.Atheism brings together essays written over a number of years for audiences of various kinds. The wpics range from popular or autobiographical material to the complex technicalities of competing theories of rationality and justification. Of the eleven essays, seven have appeared previously. There is no index, but the notes and bibliographies appended to the more scholarly essays constitute a useful guide to a major segment of the literature in philosophy of religion. Nielsen's language sometimes betrays scorn for at least some types of religious belief. But typographical inconsistencies sametimes diminish the power of his phrases, as for example when on facing pages he alludes to certain conceptions of God as "a kind of cosmic mickey-mouse" and "a kind of cosmic Mickey Mouse." The number of typographical errors and inconsistencies in the book-not all of them as pregnant as this one with theological contrasts-is annoying. The reader of these essays is constantly reminded of the sustained attacks that some of the greatest minds of modern philosophy (Hume, for example) have mounted on religious belief. But one also thinks of the remark in Wittgenstein's On Ce1·tainty: "Very intelligent and welleducat ~ people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former." This remark suggests, perhaps, why issues in philosophical theology tend w regress : Is there a God? Is it rational to believe in the existence of God? What are the criteria of rationality appropriate to the assessment of religious belief? Can we sensibly inquire about and compare alternative or competing theories of rationality? Readers of Nielsen's essays will find much to admire in his intricate deployment of complex arguments, many of which operate at one or two removes from the question of theism or atheism. But the energy and complexity of his treatment contrasts sharply with the complex question he poses in the last essay: " Why... is the philosophy of religion so boring? " (p. 224). Nielsen's own response, that there is little to be said for theism, suggests that he misunderstands something basic-not the point of arguments in favor of theism, but the nature of the interests that BOOK REVIEWS 385 underlie religious belief and the sensibilities, among religious people, that make his argumentation unpersuasive. Is the philosophy of religion boring~ Wittgenstein penned a note, published in Zettel: "Some philosophers... suffer from what may be called 'loss of problems.' Then everything seems quite simple to them, no deep problems seem t-0 exist anymore, and the world becomes broad and flat and loses all depth....'' One need not embrace the fideism Nielsen attributed to followers of Wittgenstein, in essays now nearly 20 years old, in order to hold that a sympathetic entertainment of the interests and sensibilities at stake in an undertaking is an essential ingredient in any fair and useful assessment of its rationality, legitimacy, or defensibility. It is that sympathetic entertainment that Nielsen lacks in the case of religious belief. And so he falls prey to the tendency Wittgenstein diagnosed in the case of Sir James Frazer: " His explanations... are much cruder than the sense of the observances themselves.'' There is a delightful characterization of C. D. Broad's philosophical method in A. J. Ayer's A Part of My Life: "He does not buITow under the surface, but only few can do this with profit, and it is much to have the surface properly scrubbed.'' In a similar way, Nielsen offers, in these essays, a thorough scrubbing-perhaps scouring-of the surface of theistic belief... (shrink)

In this article I assess the Invariance Principle, which states that only quantities that are invariant under the symmetries of our theories are physically real. I argue, contrary to current orthodoxy, that the variance of a quantity under a theory’s symmetries is not a sufficient basis for interpreting that theory as being uncommitted to the reality of that quantity. Rather, I argue, the variance of a quantity under symmetries only ever serves as a motivation to refrain from any commitment to (...) the quantity in question. (shrink)

Many writers in various fields--philosophy, religion, literature, and psychology--believe that the question of the meaning of life is one of the most significant problems that an individual faces. In The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, E.D. Klemke collects some of the best writings on this topic, primarily works by philosophers but also selections from literary figures and religious thinkers. The twenty-seven cogent, readable essays are organized around three different perspectives on the meaning of life. In Part I, the readings assert (...) and defend the theistic view that without the existence of God--or faith in God--life has no significance or purpose. In Part II the selections deny this thesis, defending instead the humanistic alternative--that life has or can have meaning and worth without any theistic beliefs or commitment. In the final group of readings, contributors ask if the question of the meaning of life is in itself legitimate and significant. The volume also includes an introduction by the editor and a selected bibliography. This new edition adds essays by A. J. Ayer, Hazel Barnes, William Lane Craig, Owen Flanagan, Antony Flew, Thomas Nagel, Kai Nielsen, Philip L. Quinn, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Walter T. Stace. The only anthology of its kind, The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, is ideal for courses in introduction to philosophy and human nature. It also provides an accessible and stimulating introduction to the subject for general readers. (shrink)

Part I: WHAT IS ETHICS? Plato: Socratic Morality: Crito. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part II: ETHICAL RELATIVISM VERSUS ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM. Herodotus: Custom is King. Thomas Aquinas: Objectivism: Natural Law. Ruth Benedict: A Defense of Ethical Relativism. Louis Pojman: A Critique of Ethical Relativism. Gilbert Harman: Moral Relativism Defended. Alan Gewirth: The Objective Status of Human Rights. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part III: MORALITY, SELF-INTEREST AND FUTURE SELVES. Plato: Why Be Moral? Richard Taylor: On the Socratic Dilemma. David Gauthier: Morality and (...) Advantage. Gregory Kavka: A Reconciliation Project. Derek Parfit: Later Selves and Moral Principles. Bernard Williams: Persons, Character, and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IV: VALUE. Jeremy Bentham: Classical Hedonism. Robert Nozick: The Experience Machine. Richard Taylor: Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong. Friedrich Nietzsche: The Transvaluation of Values. Derek Parfit: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best? Thomas Nagel: Value: The View from Nowhere. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part V: UTILITARIANISM AND CONSEQUENTIALISM. John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism. J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism. Kai Nielsen: Against Moral Conservatism. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism. John Hospers: Rule-Utilitarianism. Robert Nozick: Side Constraints. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VI: KANTIAN AND DEONTOLOGICAL SYSTEMS. Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals. W. D. Ross: What Makes Right Acts Right? Onora O’Neill: Kantian Formula of the End in Itself and World Hunger. Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck. Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Judith Jarvis Thomson: Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VII: CONTRACTARIAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Thomas Hobbes: The Leviathan. David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism? John Rawls: Contractualism: Justice as Fairness. T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism and Utilitarianism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VIII: VIRTUE-BASED ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Aristotle: The Ethics of Virtue. Bernard Mayo: Virtue and the Moral Life. William Frankena: A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics. Walter Schaller: Are Virtues No More than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules? Alasdair MacIntyre: The Nature of the Virtues. Susan Wolf: Moral Saints. Louis P. Pojman: In Defense of Moral Saints. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IX: THE FACT/VALUE PROBLEM: METAETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. David Hume: On Reason and the Emotions: The Fact/Value Distinction. G. E. Moore: Non-Naturalism. A. J. Ayer: Emotivism. R. M. Hare: Prescriptivism: The Structure of Ethics and Morals. Geoffrey Warnock: The Object of Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part X: MORAL REALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM. J.L. Mackie: The Subjectivity of Values. Jonathan Harrison: A Critique of Mackie’s Error Theory. Gilbert Harman: Moral Nihilism. Nicholas Sturgeon: Moral Explanations. Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Bruce Russell: Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism. Michael Smith: A Defense of Moral Realism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XI: RELIGION AND ETHICS. Plato: Morality and Religion. Immanuel Kant: God and Immortality as Necessary Postulates of Morality. George Mavrodes: Religious and the Queerness of Morality. Kai Nielson: Ethics Without God. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XII: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO CLASSICAL ETHICAL THEORY. Part A. Sociobiology and the Question of Moral Responsibility. Charles Darwin: Ethics and the Descent of Man. E.O.Wilson: Sociobiology and Ethics. Michael Ruse: Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach. Elliot Sober: Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics. J.L. Mackie: The Law of the Jungle, Evolution and Morality. Suggestions for Further Readingon Sociobiology. Part B. The Challenge of Determinism to Moral Responsibility and Desert. Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Louis Pojman: Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility:A Response to Galen Strawson. Richard Taylor: A Libertarian Defense of Free Will and Responsibility. Suggestions for Further Reading on Moral Responsibility. Glossary of Ethical Terms. (shrink)

Both the concept of a Darwinian tree of life (TOL) and the possibility of its accurate reconstruction have been much criticized. Criticisms mostly revolve around the extensive occurrence of lateral gene transfer (LGT), instances of uptake of complete organisms to become organelles (with the associated subsequent gene transfer to the nucleus), as well as the implications of more subtle aspects of the biological species concept. Here we argue that none of these criticisms are sufficient to abandon the valuable TOL concept (...) and the biological realities it captures. Especially important is the need to conceptually distinguish between organismal trees and gene trees, which necessitates incorporating insights of widely occurring LGT into modern evolutionary theory. We demonstrate that all criticisms, while based on important new findings, do not invalidate the TOL. After considering the implications of these new insights, we find that the contours of evolution are best represented by a TOL. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Myth and Investigation in Oedipus RexPeter T. Koper (bio)René Girard's rich interpretations of Attic drama include his discussion in Violence and the Sacred of the sacrificial and reciprocal nature of the mythic violence that underlies Oedipus Rex. "In the myth, the fearful transgression of a single individual is substituted for the universal onslaught of reciprocal violence. Oedipus is responsible for the ills that have befallen his people" (Girard 1977, (...) 77). Girard sees that "the tragedian's version of the Oedipus story differs radically from the myth" (72). The paradigmatic "exchanges of mutual incriminations" (72) between Oedipus and Teiresias raise the question of "whether the accusation [by Teiresias] is simply an act of reprisal arising from the hostile exchange of a tragic debate" (71) rather than a prophetic truth. The play is an investigation of killing. In the myth, the killer is Oedipus, "unequivocally" (72). How Sophocles's play departs from the myth, whether the play is an investigation that confirms the claims of the myth or whether it dramatizes the persecution of an innocent pharmakos is a question Girard leaves suspended, noting that Oedipus cannot be "both incestuous son and parricide and at the same time pharmakos" (122), since a scapegoat is by definition an innocent, chosen arbitrarily. Sandor Goodhart pursued the possibility that Oedipus "may not have killed Laius" (56) in a 1978 article, and Girard returned to the matter in The Scapegoat in 1986. Goodhart's case is based on the report of the surviving servant that Laius was killed by robbers.The servant's account, if accurate, exonerates Oedipus, who was alone when, as he himself reports, he killed every member of a group that included at least three travelers (Sophocles 1960a, 801–834; see Jebb 1893, 150; and Kammerbeck 1967, 164–65) at a "place where three roads meet" (Sophocles 1960a, 716). Oedipus, seeking the murderer of Laius, is worried by Jocasta's account of Laius's death because it reminds him of a fight he himself has had at that place. But Jocasta assures Oedipus that the servant who returned to Thebes and reported the killings said that they were done by robbers. If this is true, then Oedipus is indeed innocent of the charge levied against him by [End Page 87] Teiresias. As the next step in his effort to learn the truth, Oedipus immediately sends for the servant whose testimony appears, at this stage of Oedipus's thinking, to be decisive, for "one man cannot be the same as many" (1960a, 845). When the servant finally arrives, he is never asked the crucial question about the number of murderers. Instead, he is asked to confirm that he did give an infant child to a servant of the king of Corinth instead of abandoning him on the hillside of Mt. Cithaeron as he had been ordered to do. In the usual interpretation of the play, this omission is not decisive. Events have overtaken the investigation, and Oedipus is now not concerned with the identity of the murderer of Laius, or even with whether Oedipus is the murderer (Kammerbeck 1967, 22). He is, rather, concerned with who he is, and, explicitly, with the confirmation of his parricide and incest.Goodhart holds that the discrepancy between the servant's account and that of Oedipus is a decisive indication of Sophocles's intention in the play. In this view, the play uses a traditional myth in which Oedipus kills his father, marries his mother, and then rules Thebes, but the play is not a development of that myth into a heroic intellectual quest in which a man who is the paradigm of the Greek enlightenment pursues and learns the truth. It is rather a play about ambiguity and the impossibility of knowledge. "Rather than an illustration of the myth, the play is a critique of mythogenesis, an examination of the process by which an arbitrary fiction comes to assume the value of truth" (Goodhart 1996, 35). The arbitrary fiction in this case is the opinion that Oedipus killed Laius. A community and an individual, in the midst of the plague, hear a prophecy. They believe it. One individual is the source of the city... (shrink)